Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the reasons underlying the variable and sometimes very large differentials between United States Treasury bill rates and private sector U.S. money market rates of comparable maturity.
The movement of these differentials over time is illustrated in Observed yield spreads occur simply because calculated yield series are before-tax promised yields to maturity.
The second view of investor behavior is the "imperfect substitutes"
or "preferred habitat" view. The essence of this view is that for reasons of regulation, tradition, taxation, or accessability, different investors tend to hold different types of financial instruments. As a result, changing conditions in a particular sector of the money market may influence yield spreads over a significant period of time. Of course, the two views are not mutually inconsistent and one can argue that observed yield spreads are affected by both types of influences.
The question of the determinants of the differentials between
Treasury bill rates and other money market rates is not an empty one. In *The author would like to acknowledqe the very helpful comments of an anonymous referee. some econometric models the Treasury bill rate is the key short-term rate and other short-term rates are simply determined by the level of the bill rate. For instance, in the 1978 MIT-PENN-SSRC model the bill rate is determined in the bank reserves market, and the commercial paper rate is a linear function of the bill rate.3 This approach implicitly assumes that the perfect substitutes theory is the correct view of yield determination in the money markets.
Through a term-structure relationship, the commercial paper rate in the MPS model feeds into the corporate bond rate, which is an important determinant of real sector activity. Hence, if the perfect substitutes assumption is invalid, the model's ability to forecast economic activity is weakened.
The most common explanation of the movement in the spreads between Treasury bill and other money market rates is one consistent with the perfect substitutes view of investor behavior. According to this explanation, these spreads are caused by a cyclical risk premium pushing up the observed yields on private sector money market instruments relative to the yields on Treasury bills. However, the spreads between private sector money market rates and bill rates frequently behave quite differently than other yield spreads that isolate the influence of cyclical risk premiums.
These latter spreads generally do not rise much until the onset of a recession and typically peak near the end of a recession. In contrast, the spreads between private sector money market rates and bill rates have risen well before the beginning of recessions and have generally fallen sharply prior to the end of recessions. As a simple test of this observation, the correlation coefficients for the spread between Moody's corporate
Baa and Aaa bond rates and the spreads between private sector money market rates and bill rates were calculated over the 1963-.77 period shown in Figure 1 . The correlation coefficient between the Moody's bond yield spread and the spread between the high grade prime commercial paper rate and the bill rate is .087. The correlation coefficient between Moody's bond yield spread and the spread between the prime CD rate and the bill rate is .135. Neither of these correlation coefficients is significantly different from 0 at the 10 percent level. Consequently, cyclically varying risk premia appear not to provide a complete explanation of the movement in the spreads between private money market and Treasury bill rates.
The rest of this paper presents an explanation of the spreads '1 between bill yields and other money market yields that allows for the influence of preferred habitats as a determinant of those spreads. It is assumed at the outset that commercial paper, CD, and bankers acceptance rates behave in a manner consistent with the "perfect substitutes" view of the financial market. This assumption is based on the fact that the correlation coefficients between the monthly changes of any two of these three series are all .95 or higher. In contrast, the correlation coefficient between monthly changes in the bill and commercial paper rates is only .71, the correlation coefficient between monthly changes in the bill and CD rates is .76, and the correlation coefficient between monthly changes in the bill rate and the bankers acceptance rate is -78.
I. Preferred Habitats and Limited Habitats in the Treasury Bill Market
A fundamental characteristic of the bill market has been the erratic participation of the household sector. The general pattern of this participation in recent years is shown in Table 1 naturally want to take advantage of high market yields. However, CD's are issued in minimum amounts of $100,000 and commercial paper is issued in minimum amounts of $25,000 to $100,000 and is usually traded in lots of $100,000 or more. Consequently, a large segment of the household sector has been effectively limited to purchasing bills among the money market instruments.
To call this behavior on the part of households "preferred" is something of a misnomer. The phenomenon can more accurately be described as one of "limited habitat," a term to be used for the remainder of this article.
The behavior of the household sector described above is not necessarily incompatible with perfect substitution in the aggregate.
The theory does require, however, that the impact of abrupt shifts in household purchases of bills on spreads between private sector and bill yields be quickly offset by the reaction of other investing sectors of the economy. The decline in the holdings of bills, shown in The argument to this point has been that, especially in periods of heavy household demand, a large percentage of bills has been held by investors for whom other money market instruments are imperfect substitutes.
For these investors--many households, banks, state and local governments--bills have been the preferred or only available habitat among money market instruments for the reasons discussed above. This phenomemon might explain why these sectors hold bills in the face of yield spreads that are above a desired risk premium. This is not evidence, however, in support of the converse of this argument. That is, there is no apparent reason why holders of money market instruments other than bills would not switch to bills in the face of yield spreads below a desired risk premium. If this is the case, then the demand for bills in the aggregate would be asymmetric with respect to the spread between other money market rates and bill rates:
a fall in the spread below a necessary risk premium would have a greater impact on demand than a rise in the spread above a necessary risk premium.
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II. Specification of the Regression Model
The discussion in the previous section points to two features of the money market (through 1977) that should be taken into account in explaining historical spreads between Treasury bill and other money market yields. First, investors in the money market fall into two categories.
The first type of investor (Sector 1) --corresponding roughly to a large part of the household sector --has been limited to the purchase of bills among money market instruments. The rest of the domestic economy (Sector 2) is able to purchase bills or other money market instruments.
The second feature of the market for bills and other money market instruments is the asymmetric behavior of Sector 2. On the one hand, for reasons discussed above many investors who hold bills have not viewed other money market instruments as perfect substitutes for bills. On the other hand there are no apparent non-rate factors influencing the decision to shift to bills when spreads between other money market rates and bill rates fall below the going risk premium on private sector money market instruments.
Consequently, the demand for bills by Sector 2 may have been asymmetric with respect to the spread between bill rates and other money market rates. and the Regulation Q ceiling rate on time deposits of less than a year (RTD).
The demand for other money market instruments is 0 because of Sector l's limited habitat. Xl is a scale variable for Sector 1, to be defined below.
(1) D; = al(RTB-RTD)Xl + blX1
Sector 2 has two sets of demand equations, one in operation when (RMM-RTB) is above the current risk premium (RSK) on MM and a second when (RMM-RTB) is below the current risk premium on MM. X2 is a scale variable for Sector 2, defined be
where it is expected that e2 > a2 g2 ' c2
For the case when (RMM-RTB) > RSK, the market clearing equations in the two markets are
Subtracting (5) from (6) yields
At this point the simplifying assumption is made that the growth of the two scale variables--Xl and X2 --is roughly proportional to growth in the volume of total money market instruments outstanding. That is, we assume
Substituting (8) and (9) into (7) and solving for (RMM-RTB) yields
For the case when (RMM-RTB)<RSK, equation 10 becomes blcl-(d2-b2)02 clal (10') RMM-RTB = (RTB-RTD) (q+g+2 + (q+g2)q Because (e2+g2) by assumption is greater than (a,+c,), the coefficients of the limited habitat variable, (RTB-RTD), and the relative security supplies variable, (MM-TB)/(MM-t-TB), are expected to be smaller in equation (10') than in equation (10) . If the "perfect substitutes" view applies to the case when (RMM-RTB) < RSK, then the coefficients e 2 and g2 would be extremely high and the expected coefficients of the limited habitat and relative security supplies variables in equation (10') would be 0.
Ideally, equations (10) and (10') would be estimated directly.
Unfortunately, this can not be done because it presupposes knowledge of the current risk premium, RSK. To fix RSK at a constant level would be to assume away one of the two competing theories explaining the movement in the (RMM-RTB) spread, i.e., it would assume away the possible influence of a cyclical risk premium on the spread. For this reason an alternative estimation procedure was chosen. This procedure was to estimate the equation:
(lo") RMM-RTB = gll*K + g21*(RTB-RTI))*K + g31*RSS*K + g41*RSK*K
where RSS is now used to denote the relative security supplies variable, (MM-TB)/(MM+TB). Proxies for RSR are specified below.
K in equation (10") is a dummy variable that takes on values of 1 in periods when the limited habitat and relative security supplies variable are putting upward pressure on (RMM-RTB) and which otherwise equals zero.
Clearly, the key decision to be made in taking this approach is when to set K equal to 1. In making this decision it is useful to examine the relation- hypothesized, the spread may be above the required rink ~rcniun. 11
III. Empirical Results
Before proceeding to the estimation of equation (lo"), two matters with respect to the measurement of the relative security supplies variable, RSS, have to be discussed, and a proxy to .pick up the possible influence of a cyclical risk premium on the spreads between bill rates and private sector money market rates needs to be specified. The first question with respect to relative security supplies, is whether to use seasonally adjusted or unadjusted data. A view that has received support in the financial press is that the impact of seasonal movements in the supply of bills has created seasonal movements in the spreads between private money market rates and bill rates. There is .no compelling reason why these components should be different, although one possible argument is that the impact of the seasonal component should be less since it is anticipated. A response to this argument,is that the nonseasonal movement in bills is also anticipated. Numerous specialists in the financial markets forecast Federal borrowing activity and these forecasters focus on total financial needs, not just seasonal needs. Consequently, unadjusted data are used in the regressions below.
RSS is constructed as

MM-TB=
The second issue concerning RSS is the exclusion of holdings of the foreign sector. The assumption made here is that purchases of U.S. 
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The regressions results, reported in equation (2) of Table 3 In this regime the coefficient of the RSK proxy is negative,(actually positive, since a decline in the growth rate of real GNP implies an increase in RSK) and significant at the 10 percent level using a onetail test.
The regressions in Table 3 were also run with the CD rate minus the Treasury bill rate as the dependent variable.
As expected, given the assumption that CDs, bankers acceptances, and commercial paper are "perfect substitutes," the results were virtually the same as those reported in Table 3 . Second, the rapid growth of the money market funds can be expected to diminish the coefficients of the limited habitat and relative security supply variables for two reasons. First, these funds introduce a third .alternative to those who previously were limited to deposits or bills.
IV. Developments in 1978 and
In periods of rising spreads between private sector rates and bill rates, the yield on many money market funds will rise relative to the yield on bills. In these circumstances househslds will now have the-option of switching out of bills into money market funds. Furthermore, money market funds are a new sector that is highly sensitive to yield spreads. 19
That is, with a few exceptions, they are institutions for whom the "perfect substitutes" view of investor behavior is probably quite accurate.
Consequently, the aggregate substitution of private sector money market instruments for bills in period of rising spreads should be greater than in the past.
If the general explanation for the observed yield spreads between bill rates and the money market rates presented in this paper is correct, it can be expected for the reasons presented in this section that these spreads will not again reach the levels of 1974. 20 In contrast, if a cyclical risk premium has been the driving force behind the spreads, there is no reason why they will not again rise to past levels.
Summary and Conclusions
This article has provided evidence that (1) private sector money market instruments in periods when private sector rates rise relative to bill rates. Both of these developments should work to prevent spreads between bill rates and private money market rates from approaching past peak levels. FOOTNOTES 1. The 1963 to 1977 period is used throughout the paper. As will be explained in detail later in the paper, the beginning of this period was chosen because of data availability, while the end was chosen due to institutional changes in the money market in 1978 and 1979 that affect the arguments presented in the paper. The yield series in Figure 1 are also described later in the paper.
2. These alternative views have been described repeatedly elsewhere.
See, for instance, Roley [14] , Jaffee [lo] , and Cook and Hendershott [51.
3. This process is described in detail in Crews [6] .
4. It will be argued later, however, that institutional changes in 1978 have occurred that have largely eliminated this limitation.
5. For a description of these requirements, see Haywood [8] , the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Full Insurance of Government Deposits [l] , and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations [2] .
6. Gilbert and Lovati [7] provide a state by state description of these requirements.
7. See Lucas [13] .
8. See Summers [16] .
9. These prohibitions are described in detail in [3] .
10. This would be a relatively simple application of splined regression [15] were it not for the fact that there is more than one independent variable in equation (10") . There is no a priori reason for making the switching rule dependent on the behavior of (RTB-RTD) rather than RSS, other than the fact that (RTB-RTD) experiences very sharp cyclical movements, while RSS moves gradually over time.
11. A factor ignored throughout this discussion is the status of interest on Federal securities as exempt from state (and local) income taxes. It is probable that this status did not influence the (RMM-RTB) spread in either of the regimes discussed in the paper. In Regime 1 households,who do not have access to other money market instruments, are the net purchasers of Treasury bills. In Regime 2, financial institutions, state and local governments, and to a lesser extent nonfinancial corporations, are the net purchasers of Treasury bills. State and local governments do not pay state and local taxes. Financial institutions in 20 to 25 percent of the states pay taxes on net worth or capital, as opposed to income. In most of the other states financial institutions do pay a tax related to income. However, in almost all cases this tax is labelled a "franchise" or an "excise" tax. By designating the tax this way, states bring interest income from Federal securities under the income tax. In some states nonfinancial corporations also pay a franchise or excise tax, although in other states they do pay a true "income" tax. The one combination of circumstances in which one might'expect the tax status of Treasury bills to af'fect the (RMM-RTB) spread would be if households were heavy net purchasers of bills and if households had access to private -sector money market instruments.' It is argued later in the paper that this set of circumstances characterized the late 1970's. 14. The average of the three-and six-month rates, as opposed to one.or the other, is used in the paper because the relative magnitude of the (RMM-RTB) spread at the three-and six-month maturities has varied substantially; that is, the yield curves for RMM and RTB behave differently over the sample period. The reason for this is.an interesting question in itself. A strong possibility is that expectations of bill rate movements are influenced by the current relationship of bill rates to other money market rates. In any case since there was no reason to choose the threemonth maturity over the six-month maturity, or vice versa, a simple average of the two was used.
15. Lawler [12] has argued that the correct dependent variable to use in default'risk regressions is the "adjusted" yield spread, (RM?+RTB)/(l+R?MM>, where all interest rates are measured in fractions.
This measure is constant given a constant probability of default at maturity.
However, when both securities in question are very low risk, such as in the present case, it makes very little difference whether the spread or the adjusted spread is used. For instance, the spread rises from 22 basis points in the fourth quarter of 1965 to 310 basis points in the third quarter of 1974. The adjusted spread rises from 22 basis points to 302 basis points over the same period, only a difference of 8 basis points. The regression results with the two measures are virtually identical. Hence, the results with the spread as the dependent variable are reported in this paper. 16 . There is no a priori reason to expect the spread between private sector money market rates and Treasury bill rates to affect the level of relative security supplies, since neither the Federal government nor the private sector can switch from supplying Treasury bills to supplying private sector money market instruments, or vice versa, in response to changing interest rate spreads. Hence, the assumption of one-way causality running from relative security supplies to the interest rate spread is valid.
17. K was set equal to 1 if the current or lagged values of (RTB-RTD) were greater than or equal to c. The SSR in the five cases were c=l, 3 Interestingly, the spread between RMM and RTB jumped sharply in the period immediately following the imposition on March 15, 1980 of a 15 percent reserve requirement on assets above a base level at money market funds. In the five weeks following March 15 the spread between the three-month Treasury bill rate and the three-month prime CD rate, which had been at a level of about 1 percentage point, rose to 235 basis points (Wall Street Journal rates). The data on noncompetitive bids at Treasury bill auctions indicates a sharp rise in the purchases of bills by individuals over the same period. In the 10 weekly auctions prior to March 15 the average amount of noncompetitive awards was 20.0 percent.
In the five weekly auctions following march 15 the average amount of noncompetitive awards jumped to 27.6 percent. This translates into an increased demand for bills by individuals of over $500 million per week. 
